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Abstract: This paper examines the issue of whether harmonising taxes across the traded and non-
traded sectors is desirable. Preferential treatment for the traded sector might be justified if either
the output response of subsidies are higher in the traded sector or if the jobs generated in the
traded sector are “better” than those in the non-traded sector. I examine these two issues using a
simple two sector small open economy model to analyse the first question and input-output analysis




rish industrial policy has favoured the manufacturing sector and more recently
some traded services sectors with a lower 10 per cent corporation tax rate in
addition to various grants and subsidies. The current trend is towards
harmonisation of tax rates across sectors. The standard corporation tax rate
has been falling in recent years. The government has a long-term commitment
to gradually reduce the standard rate to 12.5 per cent by the year 2003. The
concession granting the 10 per cent rate to some sectors is due to expire in the
year 2003 and it is envisaged that there will be a uniform rate of 12.5 per cent.
This paper analyses the desirability of tax harmonisation by looking at two364 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
questions. First, will subsidising the traded sector (or having preferential tax
treatment for the traded sector) increase output? Second, are jobs created as a
result of a subsidy to the traded sector more “desirable” than jobs created as a
result of a subsidy to the non-traded sector? The first issue has been analysed
in O’Rourke (1994) and Denny, Hannan and O’Rourke (1995) who use a
computable general equilibrium model to assess the impact of a subsidy on
equilibrium output and employment in other sectors while NESC (1990)
emphasises the role of industrial policy in tackling unemployment. Denny,
Hannan and O’Rourke (1995) predict that harmonising capital taxes will increase
unemployment. As they point out, this conclusion depends on the assumption of
greater capital mobility in the modern sector. It could be argued that this is a
short-run result in that in the long-run capital would be equally mobile across
sectors. I develop a two sector small open economy model to examine under
what circumstances the output response of a subsidy to the traded sector would
be greater than the output response in the non-traded sector and conclude that
there is not a compelling argument that output will increase more in the traded
sector.
Another possibility is that the response to a subsidy in the traded sector will
be greater because traded sector jobs are more productive than non-traded jobs
as discussed below. To address the second issue of whether subsidising the traded
sector creates more “desirable” jobs than subsidising the non-traded sector I
use a framework developed by Dickens (1995) which allows us to measure the
returns in wages and employment from subsidising particular sectors where
there are twenty-eight sectors. Dickens’s analysis is based on models outlined
in Katz and Summers (1989) or Bulow and Summers (1986). In these models
workers earn high rents in particular sectors. This justifies an industrial policy
favouring these sectors. McKeon (1980) states that “The IDA’s experience to
date is that the labour employed in projects provides the greatest single
contribution to discounted value added”; so looking at industrial policy as a way
of generating employment rents seems reasonable.
While the analysis was hampered by poor wage data in particular some of
the empirical results were surprising. Some of the service sectors had the highest
measured rents. In particular when we account for the fact that gross wage
differentials overstate rents and that many workers in jobs resulting from
subsidies come from sectors where they had previously been earning rents, the
results do not support subsidising the manufacturing sector.
O’Malley (1995) uses an input-output style analysis to look at the number of
service jobs associated with manufacturing. He concludes that manufacturing
is an important source of support for jobs in the services sector and that overseas
industry makes a significant contribution to supporting secondary services
employment as well as direct manufacturing employment. O’Malley’s analysisLABOUR MARKET RENTS AND IRISH INDUSTRIAL POLICY 365
cannot be used to evaluate the argument for subsidising particular sectors since
it looks at the degree to which manufacturing jobs support service sector jobs,
but not the other way around. If, for example, particular service sectors make
significant purchases from domestic industry, it could be that it is the services
sector that should be subsidised or that there is no strong argument for
subsidising one sector over another.
II  A SIMPLE MACRO MODEL
One justification for subsidising the traded over the non-traded sector is that
it may generate a bigger output response because the size of the non-traded
sector is limited (see the comments by Kieran Kennedy in the discussion following
O’Rourke (1994) for example). It could be that a pound’s worth of subsidy
generates more output in the traded compared to the non-traded sector.1 In this
section I analyse the issue of what determines the output response from a pound’s
worth of subsidy given either to the traded or the non-traded sector. The price
in the traded sector is determined on the world market and is exogenous. The
price in the non-traded sector is determined by the intersection of domestic
supply and demand. Since factors can move freely between the two sectors, I
will assume both sectors face the same supply elasticity. Figure 1 illustrates the
effect of subsidising output in the traded sector. The supply curve shifts to the
right, output increases but the price remains unchanged. If non-traded goods
are used in traded production, the higher quantity of tradeables will lead to an
increase in demand for non-tradeables and a higher price and quantity. If non-
tradeables are used in tradeable production the higher price for non-tradeables
will shift the supply curve for tradeables inwards. We might expect equilibrium
output in both sectors to increase if the traded sector is subsidised.
Figure 2 analysis a subsidy to the non-traded sector. The non-traded supply
curve shifts down leading to a lower price. If non-tradeables are an input in
tradeable production the supply for tradeables increases and the higher traded
output increases demand for non-tradeables.
The next step is to derive a condition that will determine whether a pound’s
worth of subsidy will generate more income overall if it is spent in the traded or
non-traded sector. This will depend on the relative size of the sectors and the
output responses outlined graphically above. I then use a two sector constant
elasticities model to derive a sufficient condition for when it will be cheaper to
subsidise the non-traded sector. The cost per unit of output of a percentage
subsidy of Tj on output in the traded and non-traded sectors are given respectively
1. We could think of this as a more macro level application of the argument in Honohan (1996),
where the industrial development authority acts like a discriminating monopolist choosing optimal
subsidy on a case by case basis to maximise the benefits of the subsidy.366 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
in Equations (1) and (2). Pj is the price level in the traded (t) sector and the
starting price in the non-traded (n) sector. A subsidy in sector j causes growth
p j
n in the non-traded price level (traded prices are exogenous). Qj is initial output
in sector j, gj is the percentage growth in output in sector j from a subsidy on
sector j and gjk is the percentage growth in output in sector j from a change in
the subsidy rate in sector k. The numerators in the two equations below are the
costs of an ad valorem subsidy Tj on each sector at the post subsidy prices. The
denominators are the value of all output produced as a result of the subsidy
evaluated at the post subsidy prices.
  
TtPtQt(1+ gt)
PtQtgt + Pn(1+P n
t )Qngnt
(1)
Figure 1: Subsidising the Traded Sector







We call traded share of income z=PtQt/(PtQt+PnQn) and non-traded share (1–z),



































Equation (1’) shows the cost of a subsidy on the traded sector per pounds worth
of output generated and (2’) the cost of a subsidy on the non-traded sector per
pounds worth of output generated. We can see from (1’) and (2’) that if gn>gt and
Y>X<1 these are sufficient conditions for the cost of generating output by
subsidising the traded sector to be more expensive than subsidising the non-
traded sector. The next step is to look at a simple structure for the economy to
try and shed some light on when these sufficient conditions will hold.
I assume a competitive two sector economy with constant-elasticity demand
and supply curves except for the demand for tradeables which is infinite at the
world price.
   Qn
s = An[Pn(1+ Tn)]
es (3)
   Qt
s = At[Pt(1+ Tt)]
es Pn
etn (4)




I assume the same supply elasticity across sectors. The elasticity of demand for
non-tradeables is a constant ed and the elasticity of demand for non-tradeables
with respect to the quantity of tradeables is a constant ent. The model ignores
income effects. Clearly the demand for non-tradeables and therefore the
equilibrium price and quantity depends on the overall level of income in the
economy, so that subsidies that effect income will effect the equilibrium outcome
via this effect. Including a model of consumer demand would greatly complicate
the model and possibly would not change the results. If we find in our model for
example, that subsidising non-traded output leads to a bigger increase in income368 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
than subsidising traded output, incorporating the increase in demand for non-
tradeables resulting from this income increase would magnify the result by
increasing income further.
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(6)
Using this expression for non-tradeable prices in Equations (3) and (4) gives us
reduced form equations for tradeable and non-tradeable equilibrium output. To
get the percentage change in output in each sector we take the derivative of the
log of output in each sector with respect to a change in the tax rate in each
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(1+ Tn)(ed +e ntetn -e s)
= gnt (10)
The numerators and denominators of Equations (7) to (10) are all negative and
the denominators are the same in all four equations. To be able to compare
Equations (1’) and (2’) we also need to be able to account for the percentage
change in non-traded prices resulting from a change in the tax rate in either
sector. To do this we differentiate the log of Equation (6) with respect to the














(1+ Tt)(-ed -e ntetn +e s)
=P n
t  (12)LABOUR MARKET RENTS AND IRISH INDUSTRIAL POLICY 369
If we think of a starting point where Tt=Tn, the following conditions are sufficient
for subsidising output in the non-traded sector to be cheaper than subsidising
output in the traded sector. The traded sector has a bigger share of output than
the non-traded sector,2 Y>X, gn>gt, X<1 and the supply elasticity is less than
one. Using Equations (7) to (12) we see that (a) to (c) below are sufficient for the
conditions listed above to hold.







ent is the elasticity of non-traded demand with respect to traded output and etn
is the elasticity of traded supply with respect to non-traded prices. We see that
other things equal a small own price elasticity of supply makes the condition
more likely to be met. It might be argued on that basis, that subsidising the
non-traded sector is a better bet if the economy is close to full employment. If
the elasticity of traded output with respect to non-traded prices is big relative
to the elasticity of non-traded demand with respect to traded output, the condition
is also likely to be met. Appendix 2 shows the ranges of these parameters where
the conditions above will be true or false. It should be noted that these are
sufficient conditions so they will fail in cases where it is still cheaper to subsidise
the non-traded sector. To illustrate we can look at the other side of the coin. If
the non-traded sector is bigger than the traded sector we can show that sufficient
conditions for subsidising the traded sector to be cheaper than subsidising the
non traded are given by conditions [a] to [c] above with the inequality signs
reversed. Some cases where these sufficient conditions are met are given in
Table 3 in Appendix 2. What the tables show is that it is not at all obvious that
subsidising the traded sector generates more output. The results do not provide
a strong basis for subsidising one sector over the other.
III  GOOD AND BAD JOBS
This section outlines the procedure developed in Dickens (1995) for analysing
the effect of subsidies on labour market rents. Taking account of the linkages
between sectors the analysis asks whether policies leading to the expansion of
particular sectors would be expected to lead to a greater expansion of employment
in high wage jobs, relative to the wages in jobs created by expanding other
2. Barry (1997) assumes the traded sector has a share of around 55 per cent of the Consumer
Price Index.  The reason a bigger traded share makes subsidising the traded sector more expensive
is because all output receives the subsidy not just output generated by the subsidy.370 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
sectors. We can think of obvious reasons why an increase in jobs in sectors with
relatively high wages would not represent a net gain to the economy. If high
wages reflect human capital, ability differences or compensating differentials
for example, expanding the high wage sectors will involve no net gain to the
economy. Each of these explanations is likely to be important to some degree
(many argue that these type of factors explain all wage differentials) and to the
extent that they are wage differentials greatly overstate rents. For example in
Dickens (1995) basic controls for observed characteristics reduces wage
differentials from 35 per cent to 20 per cent, and in many studies observed
controls reduce unexplained wage differentials below this (see Katz and Summers
(1989) for example).
In Dickens’s framework industrial policy is justified by the versions of the
efficiency wage model outlined in Bulow and Summers (1986) or Katz and
Summers (1989). The marginal product of the marginal worker in the high wage
sector is higher than in the low wage sector justifying a subsidy which transfers
workers to the higher productivity jobs. If high wages were due to unionisation
in a monopoly union model a subsidy would be justified since the marginal
union worker would have higher productivity than the marginal non-union
worker. If there was strictly efficient bargaining in the sense that workers were
paid high wages but employment was set where the marginal revenue product
of labour equalled the outside wage, a subsidy would not be justified. This is
because the marginal worker in the high wage industry would be no more
productive than the marginal worker in the low wage industry, so that the net
gain to the economy of expanding the high wage sector would be zero. In a small
country like Ireland where foreign investment is important and most of the
gain from attracting foreign investment is in the wage bill, and most of the rest
of output represents a return to foreign capitalists, this objection may not be as
important.
Using input-output tables I start with a transactions matrix T plus a vector
of final demands F.3 Output by sector is given in the vector X. The element xij
represents sales of goods from sector i to sector j.4
3. The generation of the (I-A) inverse matrix is described in Henry (1986).
4. As a referee has pointed out, In contrast to the theoretical model in the previous section the
input output analysis is based on a linear model.  It does however give a picture of the average
linkages between sectors.  So for example if the true model is not a fixed coefficients linear model
the marginal purchases of sector i from sector j may differ from the average.  Unfortunately, given
the data constraint we have to hope this is not a serious problem.LABOUR MARKET RENTS AND IRISH INDUSTRIAL POLICY 371
  
x11 + x12 + ... + x1n
x21 + x22 + ... + x2n
... + ... + ... + ...











































By dividing each element xij by xi we generate an n dimensional matrix A. Note
that
AX + F = X
Also note that if I is an n dimensional identity matrix
F = X – AX = (I – A)X
The (I – A)–1 matrix is n dimensional and any element bij gives the value of
inputs from sector i associated with each pound’s worth of final demand from
sector j.5 Next following the methodology of Dickens (1995) I generate an n
dimensional matrix where each column is the vector of hours worked per unit of
output in each sector (each column is identical). Multiplying this matrix by the
(I – A)–1 matrix on an element by element basis gives an n dimensional labour
use matrix L. Any element of the labour use matrix lij gives the number of hours
in sector i resulting from each pound’s worth of final demand in sector j.
The next issue is to measure labour market rents. I use the difference between
the hourly wage in any sector and the lowest hourly wage as a measure of rents
(the agricultural sector hourly wages were incredibly low at about thirty pence
so I used the next lowest wage which was from wholesale and retail trade as the
wage in Agriculture also). If R is the column vector of rents per hour in each
sector then R'L gives a vector of rents generated in the economy from an increase
in the demand of a pound in any sector. (The R'L vector is the Rent by Sector
row of Table 1.)
The R'L vector overestimates rents generated from the expansion of one sector
for a number of reasons. As argued above a substantial part (and some argue
all) differences in gross wages reflect differences in worker and job characteristics.
Additionally, the way we measure rents implicitly assumes that when hours
worked increases in any sector the worker had not been earning rents in some
other sector. One response to this is to assume that when employment expands
in any sector the workers come proportionately from all sectors. We take an
employment weighted average of rents in each sector and subtract it from the
vector of rents to get (R–A) and then generate (R–A)'L. (The vector (R–A)'L
corresponds to the Net Rents row of Table 1.)

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4374 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
The Net Rents calculated above could be seen as being appropriate in an
economy at full employment where there is no net employment growth. The
Gross rents measure assumes all newly employed workers get our estimate of
the outside option and might be relevant if there is high unemployment or perfect
labour mobility and we are happy to have immigrants take employment. This
issue of what the appropriate shadow cost for labour is in the context of project
evaluation of industrial projects by the Industrial agencies is discussed in
Honohan (1996), McKeon (1980) and Ruane (1980) .
Table 3 below taken from McKeon gives the recruitment patterns of grant-
aided industry in 1980. Based on this table over half the employees who were
recruited to grant-aided industries had not previously been employed in the
Irish economy (of course that is not to say though that a school leaver who got a
job in a grant-aided industry would not have found some other job. Much of the
literature on wage differentials and labour market rents associate high skill
jobs as the high rent jobs. High skill groups are likely to be underrepresented in
the unemployed pool. If jobs are created in a high rent sector it is less likely that
unemployed workers will get these jobs. One simple way to respond to the issue
of where workers come from when a sector expands and whether they had
previously been earning rents is to think of it in terms of the fraction of the
additional hours work which would go to previously unemployed workers. Say
P is the fraction of new hours worked in any sector which would go to previously
unemployed (or zero rent) workers and (1–P) is the fraction going to workers
from a weighted average of all sectors. In this case if there is a vector of these
fractions across sectors (R – (1–P)A)'L is the vector of rents per pound of output
in each sector (this corresponds to the last three rows in Table 1 where P the
percentage of workers who had been unemployed is assumed to be the same
across sectors).
Table 3: Recruitment Patterns for Grant-Aided Industry
Source School Live Manufacturing Agriculture Other Returned House-
Leavers Register Emigrants wives
& AnCO
% 23.3 18.4 24.1 4.9 17 3.6 8.7
Source: McKeon p. 12.
IV  DATA
The 1990 Input-Output Tables provide a breakdown of transactions between
41 sectors, as well as final demand total output and other input costs by sector.
The employment, usual hours worked and wage data came from the LabourLABOUR MARKET RENTS AND IRISH INDUSTRIAL POLICY 375
Force Survey, the Census of Industrial Production and the quarterly series of
Earnings and Hours Worked issued by the CSO. Appendix 1 lists the sectors
used and how they correspond with the Labour Force Survey and Census of
Industrial Production.
For Non-Manufacturing sectors the Labour Force Survey was used for hours
and employment and the hourly wage by sector was generated as wages and
salaries from the input-output tables divided by total hours worked. Hours
worked per unit of output was generated as total hours divided by output from
the input-output tables. Some sectors (service sectors in particular) had to be
aggregated to the sectoral levels given in the Labour Force Survey. Also the
Labour Force survey data on hours worked by sector is more aggregated than
the employment data so when it was necessary I assumed the same hours worked
across sectors where this aggregation took place.
For Manufacturing sectors, the Census of Industrial Production and the series
on Hours and Earnings are more disaggregated than the Labour Force Survey.
The series on Hours and Earnings was the source for usual hours worked and
the Census of Industrial Production for employment. The Census of Industrial
Production has a narrower scope than the Labour Force Survey, (it only counts
establishments with three or more people for example). However, in the analysis
I use hours worked per unit of output and the hourly wage by sector. Since the
Census of Industrial Production gives a measure of total output in each sector,
as long as I calculate hours per unit of output and hourly wages entirely from
data in the Census of Industrial Production and the series on hours and earnings,
hopefully I will overcome any bias from using the Labour Force Survey for some
sectors and the Census of Industrial Production for others.
Comparing the hourly wage in Table 2 with Rent by Sector in Table 1 we see
that accounting for linkages across sectors as we do in Table 1 makes a significant
difference to what look like the good and bad industries. For example, Beverages
and Tobacco are high wage industries in Table 2 yet when we account for the
labour input across sectors rents are not that high in Table 1. A surprising feature
of the results is the high wages in many service sectors. The Insurance, Finance
and Business Services category possibly contains a lot of high skill and
professional workers. Professional Services, Other Industries and Personal
Services are aggregated into one sector because of data limitations. This sector
contains very different kinds of workers including educational workers,
professionals and laundry workers, so we need to be careful about interpreting
the results. In some sectors such as Mining or Building and Construction we
should clearly be wary that wage differentials reflect compensating differentials.
Public Administration is clearly also a special case.
Table 1 does not provide any compelling evidence for subsidising the
manufacturing sector when we look at the net rents row. Based on the data in376 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
Table 3 we might alternatively allow 50 per cent of workers to come from
unemployment. Manufacturing sectors do not have particularly high rents and
indeed some sectors have negative rents. Given that as argued rents are probably
significantly overstated in gross wage differentials there is no evidence here to
support subsidising Manufacturing. If anything some of the service sectors
generate the highest rents but given the degree of aggregation and that skill
factors might be particularly important in some of these sectors we should be
cautious about inferring too much from this.
V  CONCLUSION
Sweeny (1992) provides a Table summarising the European Commission’s
second survey of state aids. The survey shows aids to manufacturing represented
6.2 per cent of value added between 1986/88. The evidence in this paper suggests
that there is not a strong case for continuing subsidies to manufacturing based
on the labour markets rents generated.
The notion that output is more responsive to subsidies in some sectors than
others, as outlined in Honohan (1996) might be one rationale for subsidising
some sectors. The idea is that the industrial development agencies act like
discriminating monopolists in setting the grant level in different projects. The
results of the theoretical model outlined, do not support the idea that this
argument can be used to justify different tax rates for manufacturing and traded
services. When we account for the linkages across sectors the empirical analysis
discounts any argument that subsidising the traded sector will provide better
jobs. Given these results the move towards tax harmonisation across sectors
seems like a good idea.
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APPENDIX 1: Industry Classifications
Classification from Input- Labour Force Census Industrial
Output Tables Survey Sector Production
NACE Codes
01 Agriculture, Forestry and Agriculture, Forestry
Fishing and Fishing
03 Coal/Lignite Briquettes Mining, Quarrying
and Turf Production
05 Products of Coking
07 Petrol Products/Nat. Gas
11 Radioactive material & Ores
13 Metals and Ores
09 Electricity/Gas/Water 13, 16 & 17
15 Non Metallic Mineral Products 24378 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
APPENDIX 1 (Cont’d): Industry Classifications
Classification from Input- Labour Force Census Industrial
Output Tables Survey Sector Production
NACE Codes
17 Chemical Products 25-26
19 Metal products excl. Machinery
& Transport Equipment 31
21 Agric./Industrial Machinery 32
23 Office Machines 33 & 37
25 Electrical Goods 34
27 Motor Vehicles 35
29 Other Transport Equipment 36
31 Meat/Meat Products 412
33 Milk & Dairy Products 413





39 Tobacco Products 429
41 Textiles/Clothing 43 & 453-456
43 Leather/Footwear 44, 451
45 Wooden Products/Furniture 46
47 Paper Printing Products 47
49 Rubber & Plastic Products 481-483
51 Other Manufacturing 49
53 Building & Construction Building & Construction
57 Wholesale & Retail Trade Wholesale Distribution
Retail Distribution
(Aggregated)
69 Credit & Insurance Insurance, Finance and
71 Business Services Business Services
61 Inland Transport Transport, Communi-
63 Maritime/Air transport cations and
65 Auxillary Transport Storage
67 Communication Services
81 General Public Services Public Administration
and DefenceLABOUR MARKET RENTS AND IRISH INDUSTRIAL POLICY 379
APPENDIX 1 (Cont’d): Industry Classifications
Classification from Input- Labour Force Census Industrial
Output Tables Survey Sector Production
NACE Codes
73 Renting of Immoveable Goods Professional Services
79 Other Market Services Other Industries
55 Repair Recovery Services Personal
59 Lodging & Catering Services Services (Aggregated)
89 Non-Market Health Services
93 Other Non-Market Services
The first column gives the input-output sector. If there is more than one I/O sector in a
row they were aggregated to make them consistent with labour market Data. The
corresponding labour market Data came from the Labour Force Survey if there is an
entry in the second Column or the Census of Industrial Production and Quarterly Series
of Hours and Earnings if there is an entry in the third column. LFS industry classifications
are based on those used in the 1986 Census.
APPENDIX 2: Simulations of Sufficient Conditions
Table A2.1: TRUE Indicates sufficient conditions for subsidising
non-tradeables being cheaper hold
supply elasticity 0.1
ent
etn    0.1    0.2    0.3    0.4    0.5    0.6    0.7    0.8    0.9
0.1 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
0.2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
0.3 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
0.4 FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
0.5 FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
0.6 FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
0.7 FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
0.8 FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
0.9 FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
   1 FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE380 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
Table A2.2: TRUE Indicates sufficient conditions for subsidising
non-tradeables being cheaper hold
supply elasticity 0.5
ent
etn     0.1     0.2     0.3     0.4     0.5     0.6     0.7     0.8     0.9
0.1 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
0.2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
0.3 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
0.4 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
0.5 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
0.6 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE
0.7 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE
0.8 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE
0.9 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
   1 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE




etn   1.1    1.2    1.3    1.4    1.5    1.6    1.7    1.8    1.9
0.1 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
0.2 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
0.3 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
0.4 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
0.5 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
0.6 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE
0.7 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
0.8 TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
0.9 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
   1 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE